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1963] RECENT DECISIONS 1583 
TAXATION-FEDERAL TAX LIENS--PRIORITY OF SENIOR FEDERAL LIEN 
OVER LOCAL TAX LIEN IN MORTGAGE FoRECLOSURE-Plaintiff, a first mort-
gagee, instituted a foreclosure proceeding joining the mortgagors, a second 
mortgagee, several judgment creditors, and the United States Government. 
The Government's lien had been recorded subsequently to the first mortgage 
but had attached prior to the accrual of various local real estate taxes. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, that the premises be sold free 
of the United States lien but subject to all local real property taxes, was 
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granted.1 After reversal on appeal,2 the court again granted summary 
judgment and effected the same distribution, this time by directing that 
all local real property taxes be paid as expenses of sale3 pursuant to 
section 1087 of the New York Civil Practice Act.4 The appellate division 
modified this judgment so as to give the United States priority over the 
local tax liens, and affirmed.5 On appeal to the court of appeals, held, 
reversed, two judges dissenting. State law determines the interest held by 
the taxpayer, the procedure in lien foreclosure and the method of payment. 
A federal tax lien is enforceable only against the surplus from a mortgage 
foreclosure sale in which the mortgagor has an interest. Such a lien does 
not, therefore, have priority over subsequently accruing local real prop-
erty taxes which are deemed, under state law, to be expenses of a fore-
closure sale. Buffalo Savings Bank v. Victory, 11 N.Y.2d 31, 181 N.E.2d 
413, 226 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1962), rev'd per curiam sub nom. United States v. 
Buffalo Savings Bank, 371 U.S. 229 (1963). 
Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code6 creates a general lien on 
all property and rights in property of a taxpayer for all unpaid federal 
taxes for which provision is not otherwise specifically made.7 The purpose 
of this section is to immobilize all of the taxpayer's property until his 
federal taxes are paid or enforcement steps are taken to protect the 
Government's priority. The lien attaches automatically upon the Com-
missioner's demand for payment and relates back to the date of assessment, 
~perating, in effect, as a "secret lien" with priority over all subsequent 
creditors, with or without notice.8 In recognition of the blatant inequities 
1 Buffalo Sav. Bank v. Victory, 17 Misc. 2d 564, 186 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Erle County Ct. 
1959). 
2 Buffalo Sav. Bank v. Victory, 11 App. Div. 2d 158, 202 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1960). 
3 "Where a judgment rendered in an action to foreclose a mortgage upon real 
property directs a sale of the real property, the officer making the sale must pay out 
of the proceeds • • • all taxes, assessments and water rates which are liens upon the 
property sold • • • • [T)hese payments are deemed expenses of sale • • • ." N.Y. CIV. 
PRAc. Am: § 1087. 
4 Buffalo Sav. Bank v. Victory, 26 Misc. 2d 443, 206 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Erle County Ct. 
1960). 
5 Buffalo Sav. Bank v. Victory, 13 App. Div. 2d 207, 215 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1961). 
6 "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after 
demand, the amount • . • shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all 
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." 
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6321. The tax lien statute is commonly traced to 14 Stat. 
107 (1866), but substantially the same statute appeared in 13 Stat. 470-71 (1865). 
7 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6324(a), (b), provides for special liens for estate and gift 
taxes, and § 5004 for taxes on distilled spirits. The special tax liens are not restricted by 
the provisions of the general tax lien. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 
(1943). In addition, there are provisions for priority in case of administration of insolvent 
debtors' estates outside of bankruptcy, REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958), 
and in bankruptcy, BANKRUl"fCY Am: § 64(a), 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C 
§ 104(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
s INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6322. See generally Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-Their 
Nature and Priority, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 241-45 (1953); Felton, What the Supreme Court 
Court Says About the Federal Tax Lien, 37 TAXES 45 (1959); Sarner, Correlation of 
Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal Taxes, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 739 (1947). 
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occasioned by the priority automatically accorded the secret lien, Congress, 
in 1913, provided that the lien should not be effective as against mortgagees, 
purchasers, and judgment creditors, until notice of the lien had been made 
a matter of public record.9 Pledgees were later added to the list of pro-
tected classes.1° Since then Congress has taken no further action toward 
the adoption of a concise standard of priority, and the duty of formulating 
standards for determining the priority of federal tax liens has accordingly 
devolved upon the federal courts,11 which have unequivocally recognized 
that federal liens could be subordinated to prior non-federal liens under 
the doctrine "first in time, first in right."12 In determining exactly when 
non-federal liens were perfected for priority purposes, the courts incor-
porated into section 6321 the "choateness doctrine" which had initially 
been developed to determine the priority of debts due the United States 
from an insolvent taxpayer.13 This doctrine is applicable only to non-
federal liens and requires that, for them to be perfected, not only must 
the lienor be identified and the amount of the lien certain, but the prop-
erty to which the lien attaches must be specifically ascertained.14 
The peculiar rules applicable in determining the relative priority of 
federal tax liens frequently engender a complex situation of circular 
priority.111 The circularity arises, for example, when a federal tax lien 
is subsequent and therefore subordinate to a mortgage, but thereafter 
a state tax lien is imposed which is given priority over the mortgage by 
O 37 Stat. 1016 (1913), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (1958). When this legislation was 
passed, it was noted that the tax lien was so comprehensive that without remedial 
legislation all persons dealing with title to real estate were faced with the impossible 
task of ascertaining whether any person who owned the real estate at any time had 
been delinquent in the payment of his taxes. H.R. REP. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1912). This amendment is now embodied in INT. REV. ConE of 1954, § 6323. Cf. United 
States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893). 
10 53 Stat. 882-83 (1939), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (1958). 
11 The question of federal priority is a federal question. See, e.g., Aquilino v. United 
States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955); United 
States v. Security Trust &: Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 49 (1950). The United States may be 
joined in a foreclosure proceeding when it has a claim on the premises involved, 28 
U.S.C. § 24IO(a) (1958) (state proceeding); Fm. R. Crv. P. 4(d)(4) (federal proceeding). 
See generally Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems (pts. 1-2), 13 TAX L. 
R.Ev. 247, 281, 459, 529 (1958). 
12 E.g., United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954); Rankin v. 
Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177 (1827). Cf. Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal 
Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 
905, 925 n.116 (1954). 
18 R.Ev. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952). See generally United States v. 
Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941); County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929); 
Kennedy, supra note 12, at 905-18. 
14 Until United States v. Security Trust &: Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950), when the 
Supreme Court adopted the choateness test for § 6321, the lower courts had ignored 
this rule and treated the federal tax lien as having no special priority. Many such cases 
are collected by Kennedy, supra note 12, at 924 n.115. 
111 See generally Benson, Circuity of Lien-A Problem in Priorities, 19 MINN. L. REv. 
139 (1935); Gilmore, Circular Priority Systems, 7I YALE L.J. 53 (1961); Plumb, The 
Priorities of Federal Taxes over State and Local Taxes, 12 NAT'L TAX. J. 204, 208 (1959). 
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state law.16 The argument that, since a prior mortgage is preferred by 
federal law, any lien which by state law is senior to the mortgage should 
also prevail over the federal lien17 was rejected by the Supreme Court 
in United States v. City of New Britain.18 In practical effect, under the 
New Britain rule, the federal lien is entitled to satisfaction out of what-
ever remains after a fund equal to the amount of the prior mortgage is 
set aside. Thus, if the state should still wish to assert its priority with 
respect to its junior tax lien, it must do so from this fund, to the detriment 
of the mortgagee who was prior in time to both Government liens.19 
The decision in the principal case by the court of appeals is one 
of a series of recent decisions illustrating attempts by the state legislatures 
and courts to find an alternative to the dilemma of being forced either to 
deny state property tax liens priority over prior mortgages, which would 
seriously impair the tax revenues of state and local governments,· or allow 
the collateral impairment of the property rights of private creditors by the 
junior federal tax lien through an application of the federal rule for 
resolving circuity of priority.20 The per curiam reversal by the Supreme 
Court, although predictable, makes it apparent that such efforts to confer 
a priority for state liens over their federal counterparts, however ingenious, 
will meet a similar fate. 
16 Circular prjority arises where A is prior to B, who is prior to C, who by state law 
is given "super priority" over A, so that every lien is ahead of one of the others and 
behind another. A typical example would be where a $5,000 mortgage is prior to the 
recording of a $6,000 federal tax lien, which is superior to a lien for $4,000 in delin-
quent property taxes. The state in which the property is sold at foreclosure for $9,000 
would prefer the local tax lien over the mortgage, leaving the mortgagee only $1000. 
17 See, e.g., Brown v. General Laundry Serv., Inc., 139 Conn. 363, 94 A.2d 10 (1952), 
rev'd sub nom. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); Board of 
Supervisors v. Hart, 26 So. 2d 361 (La. 1946); Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del Ch. 
232, 124 Atl. 577 (Ch. 1924). 
18 347 U.S. 81 (1954). See generally PLUMB & WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 77-81 
(1961). 
10 See text accompanying note 38 infra. Even after New Britain, United States attor-
neys contended that, because the state precluded the mortgagee and the federal lien 
precluded the state, the federal lien should be satisfied ahead of both. See, e.g., Ex-
change Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 246 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. City of Dallas v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 868 (1957). 
20 An excellent example of the dissension this problem has caused among state courts, 
and of the casuistry and semantics used in the attempts to subordinate the federal lien, 
is provided by the divisions in the lower New York courts on the construction and 
application of § 1087 of the New York Civil Practice Act. See, e.g. (federal lien superior), 
Cooperative Loan &: Sav. Soc'y v. McDermott, 14 App. Div. 2d 590, 218 N.Y.S.2d 268 
(1961); First Fed. Sav. &: Loan Ass'n v. Lewis, 14 App. Div. 2d 150, 218 N.Y.S.2d 857 
(1961); Metro Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 9 App. Div. 2d 356, 194 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1959); 
(state lien superior), Rik.con v. Two Boro Dress Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 591, 171 N.Y.S.2d 19 
(Sup. Ct. 1957), modified mem., 8 App. Div. 2d 986, 190 N.Y.S.2d 790, modified on re-
argument mem., 9 App. Div. 2d 783, 193 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1959), appeal denied, 7 N.Y.S.2d 
711 (1960); Kronenberg v. Ellenville Nurseries &: Greenhouses, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 247, 196 
N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Cf. Stadelman v. Hornell Woodworking Corp., 172 F. Supp. 
156 (W.D.N.Y. 1958). See notes 2, 4, 5 supra. Two other lower courts on the authority 
of the principal case have denied federal priority. West Side Fed. Sav. &: Loan Ass'n v. 
Jandell Contracting Corp., 227 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Dime Sav. Bank v. Reyna! 
Park Lawns, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 107, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See note 42 infra. 
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Though cognizant of the futility of directly contravening the Supreme 
Court's refusal to recognize the almost universal rule under state law 
which accords real property taxes a priority over all existing liens, the 
court of appeals attempted to distinguish the New Britain rule by four 
lines of argumentation, each of which has at some time been proffered 
unsuccessfully by the states. 
The first proposition is that, because of its conceded superiority over 
both the mortgagee's and mortgagor's interests, the state lien, which at-
taches directly to a specific piece of real property, must be satisfied before 
a general lien, which attaches only to the mortgagor's interest in the 
property.21 This contention is, in effect, an attempt to apply to the gen-
eral federal lien a choateness test similar to that applied by the federal 
courts to all non-federal liens. Yet, even before the adoption of the choate-
ness rule for determining the priority of federal liens created under section: 
6321,22 it was established that a federal lien is neither invalid nor inferior 
merely because it attaches to a number of pieces of property rather than 
to a single piece, and cannot for this reason be subordinated to a junior 
lien attaching to a specific piece of property.23 The federal lien attaches 
directly to the property to the extent of the taxpayer's interest therein, 
placing the United States not "in the shoes of the mortgagor,"24 as con-
tended by the court of appeals, but in the position of the owner of a 
property interest which the state or municipality has no power to impair 
without congressional consent.25 
The court's second line of reasoning was grounded upon Congress's 
partial reliance, in its provision for a federal tax lien, upon concepts and 
procedures of property law as defined by the states. Under this rationale 
the federal lien attaches only to the "interest" of the taxpayer as defined 
by state law, which interest by New York law is automatically reduced 
upon payment of the annually recurring real property taxes.26 This con-
tention fails, however, when it is considered that the federal lien attaches 
21 11 N.Y.2d 31, 36-37, 181 N.E.2d 413, 415, 226 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (1962). 
22 Sec note 14 supra. 
23 United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1941). See United 
States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. SI, 84 (1954); cf. United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731 
(9th Cir. 1946); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939), 
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 630 (1940). 
24 The rule of thumb that the tax collector stands in the shoes of the mortgagor is 
applicable only in measuring the quantum of property the lien attaches to, not in deter-
mining priority between competing lienors. See generally, Anderson, supra note 8, at 251. 
25 Sec, e.g., United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Michigan v. 
United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943); United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893). As of 
the date the lien attaches, the property has, in effect, two owners, the United States and 
the ta.xpayer. United States v. City of Greenville, llS F.2d 963, 964-65 (4th Cir. 1941). 
Federal ta.xes, unenforced for many years, upon enforcement exclude intervening local 
liens. E.g., United States v. City of New York, 233 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1956); Cobb v. United 
States, 172 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1949); cf. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886) 
(ta.x accruing during period held by United States not collectible from former owner on 
ademption). 
20 11 N.Y.2d 31, 36, 181 N.E.2d 413, 415, 226 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (1962). 
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to the taxpayer's interest as of the date of assessment and can in no way 
be affected thereafter by any state tax which subsequently becomes secured 
by a choate lien.27 By analogous reasoning the court further argued that 
the payment of local taxes, an expense of sale, is a part of the foreclosure 
procedure which must necessarily be complied with in order to compute 
the net proceeds from which even a first lienor can be satisfi.ed.28 The 
satisfaction of a federal lien, however, is not capable of being analogized 
to the lien of a private creditor, for only the latter is subject to the un-
limited power of the state to accord first priority to a subsequent state lien, 
whether or not labeled as "expenses of sale."29 This argument is character-
istic of attempts by the states to utilize procedural devices "to achieve in-
directly what the Supreme Court has said cannot be done directly. It 
has been held that a state's characterization of its lien as choate30 or as 
that of a judgment creditor31 will be ignored by the federal courts. Like-
wise, state laws providing for the relation back of liens for subsequently 
arising taxes have proved ineffective as a means of avoiding federal prior-
ity. 82 In a situation suggesting a problem expressly left unanswered by 
United States v. City of New Britain,33 and closely analogous to that of 
the principal case, a lien for local property taxes accruing after the 
assessment of a federal tax and paid by a mortgagee pursuant to a mort-
gage covenant has been denied the priority accorded to the mortgage.84 
These decisions, together with others evidencing an increasingly stringent 
application of the choateness test,85 indicate that in the future the federal 
27 INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 6322. See United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55-57 (1958); 
see also notes 23, 24 supra. Cf. Morgan v. Moynahan, 86 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Tex. 1949); 
Bigley v. Jones, 64 F. Supp. 389 (W.D. Okla. 1946) (a state can prevent a federal lien 
from attaching in certain instances by redefining a taxpayer's interest in property). 
28 "The United States is not interested in whether the State receives its taxes and 
water rents prior to mortgagors and judgment creditors. That is a matter of state law. 
But as to any funds in excess of the amount necessary to pay the mortgage and judgment 
creditors, Congress intended to assert the federal lien. There is nothing in the language 
of § 3672 [now 6323] to show that Congress intended antecedent federal tax liens to 
rank behind any but the specific category of interests set out therein, and the legislative 
history lends support to this impression." United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 
81, 88 (1954). (Emphasis added.) When placed in context, the authority cited by the 
court of appeals in the principal case seems questionable. 
29 Cf. United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941). 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Liverpool &: London &: Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955); 
United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v. Security Trust&: Sav. Bank, 340 
' U.S. 47, 49 (1950); Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 371 (1946). 
31 United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953). 
32 See, e.g., United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 
{1960); United States v. Reese, 131 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942); United States v. South Caro-
lina, 227 S.C. 187, 87 S.E.2d 577 (1955). 
33 347 U.S. 81, 87 n.12 (1954). 
34 United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960); 
United States v. Christensen, 269 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1959). But see Chicago Fed. Sav. &: 
Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 Ill. 2d 535, 185 N.E.2d 670 (1962). 
85 See, e.g., United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958), reversing 239 
F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956) (contractual security); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 
350 U.S. 1010 (1956), reversing 222 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955) (mech:inic's lien); United States 
v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955) (attachment liens); United States v. Goldstein, 256 F.2d 581 
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courts will similarly look past form to the substance of state devices which 
attempt to utilize the dependence of federal law upon state procedural 
and property concepts to impinge upon the priority of the federal lien. 
As its third argument, the court of appeals distinguished the principal 
case, in which the dispute arose between the mortgagee and the "creditors 
of the mortgagor" from a contest between the United States and the local 
government.36 This, however, is in effect merely an attempt to avoid 
the circuity dilemma which the federal courts would have solved by setting 
aside a fund equal to the amount of the prior mortgage. It is doubtful that 
the Supreme Court would sanction a different practice merely because the 
second of the two parties claiming satisfaction from this fund, the mort-
gagee, contests federal priority rather than the other party, the state. 
The last and most effective argument relies upon the paradoxical 
result which flows from the Supreme Court's construction of section 6321 
in its application to the real property of the delinquent taxpayer.37 The 
congressional policy behind the enactment of what is now section 6323,88-
to protect creditors with perfected claims from the "secret federal tax lien," 
is substantially impaired by reason of the fact that their interests are sub-
jected to the unpredictable contingency that the mortgagor may not pay 
subsequently accruing state or local real property taxes. In many instances. 
this result will probably have as equally serious a repercussion on financial 
transactions as the "secret lien" which Congress expressly abolished. The 
suggestion that this inequity is due to the state's insistence upon a "super 
priority" for its property tax liens fails to consider the unfeasibility of 
what is seemingly the state's only alternative; for, though the federal lien 
is general and can be enforced against all property of the taxpayer, in-
cluding after-acquired property,39 the real property tax lien is specific 
and enforceable only against the property upon which is was assessed.40 
The state, therefore, must either demand payment of its land taxes as a 
first lien, or allow its taxes to be uncollected whenever a foreclosure sale 
yields insufficient proceeds to satisfy prior lienors.41 Yet, the virtually 
complete dependence of all local governmental units on real property 
taxes and assessments42 has left the state legislatures no reasonable alter-
(2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958) (attorney's lien); United States v. 
Morrison, 247 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1957) (statutory vendor's lien); Styles v. Eastern Tractor 
Mfg. Co., 154 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (warehouseman's lien). 
so 11 N.Y.2d 31, 36, 181 N.E.2d 413, 414, 226 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (1962). 
87 11 N.Y.2d 31, 42, 181 N.E.2d 413, 418, 226 N.Y.S.2d 382, 390 (1962). 
38 See text accompanying notes 7 &: IO supra. 
so E.g., Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945). 
40 Although in theory it is possible to enforce real property taxes through liens on 
otl1cr property, real and personal, in which the "owner" has an interest, the prevailing 
complex division of "ownership" in real property through the device of future interests 
indicates that this is at least administratively impracticable. 
41 Cf. Southern Ohio Sav. Bank &: Trust Co. v. Boice, 165 Ohio St. 201, 135 N.E.2d 
382 (1956) (a vigorous protest to section 6321). 
42 In 1953 the total of all local unit property tax collections ranged from 74 (New 
York) to 97 (Indiana) percent of total local tax collections. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, 
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native. Arguments based on federal supremacy, uniformity, or the "greater 
good," when viewed against this background, fail to justify either the 
New Britain rule, or, what achieves the same result, the one-sided applica-
tion of the choateness doctrine. 
The conclusion reached by the court of appeals,43 that, if there is to 
be any derogation from the preference provided the New York state lien, 
it should be accomplished explicitly by a statute passed by the representa-
tives of the states in the national Congress, and not by the courts, though 
incorrect when referring to state liens, seems to be the conclusion estab-
lished as to the federal lien by the Supreme Court's reversal of the prin-
cipal case. Several proposals for remedial legislation typifying possible 
solutions to this priority dilemma have been advanced. The American 
Bar Association has proposed an amendment which would prefer real 
property taxes and assessments over federal liens on the theory that since 
the property itself enjoys the benefit of local services it should bear its 
corresponding share of the cost.44 An alternative proposal similar in result 
would be to retain the "first in time, first in right" principle, but apply 
to state liens the same standards of choateness as are applied to federal 
liens.45 A third proposed solution would group all assets available to 
federal and state liens under present priorities into a common fund, and 
divide this amount between botl1 on a pro rata basis.46 Upon closer exam-
ination, any one of these of similar proposed solutions may provide a 
satisfactory answer to the presently existing tax lien dilemma. 
It is inevitable that in our federal system problems such as the com-
petition for priority between the tax liens of the respective governments 
should arise. Where there is an admitted supremacy in the federal govern-
ment, these conflicts will only be compounded if evaded by the state 
-courts through incongruous and sophistic reasoning. The court of appeals 
would have been better advised had it noted that all the arguments which 
will inevitably result in the Supreme Court's upholding the superiority of 
the section 6321 lien-supremacy, uniformity, and the most good for the 
:greatest number-argue equally well for redress if sought through the 
proper channels. 
Samuel ]. McKim, Ill 
.State and Local Government Revenue in 1953, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPECIAL 
.Snmms No. 37, at 10-13 (1954). Property tax revenue in the largest city of each of eight 
;Selected states ranges from 33 percent of total revenue collections in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, to 73.4 percent in Newark, New Jersey. New York City's revenue collection is 
44.1 percent from property tax.es. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COMPENDIUM OF CITY 
:FINANCES IN 1956, at 27 (1957). But cf. Newcomer, The Decline of the General Property 
Tax, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 38 (1953). 
43 11 N.Y.2d 31, 43, 181 N.E.2d 413, 419, 226 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391 (1962). 
44 AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMIIUTTEE ON FEDERAL LIENS 8-10 
(1959); see, e.g., H.R. 4952, 4953, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); see generally Plumb, Fed-
-eral Tax Liens: Proposed Revision of the Law, 45 A.B.A.J. 351 (1959). 
45 See Plumb, supra note 15, at 214. 
46 Ibid. 
